First Person Virtue Ethics and the Anthropology of Morality
First Person Virtue Ethics and the Anthropology of Morality
Chapter 2 elaborates what is entailed in a first-person version of virtue ethics in an explicitly debating style. It argues that it is important to look at the contrasts between a first-person virtue ethics and a third-person discursive one inspired especially by Foucault. It examines ways that these positions challenge rather than support one another, despite their many areas of overlap. It particularly highlights conceptual divides regarding the status of the “self.” Although the chapter pays special attention to anthropological voices, the question raised—why we need a first-person version of virtue ethics—speaks to a much broader interdisciplinary conversation.
Keywords: agency, Foucauldian ethics, humanism, morality, neo-Aristotelian ethics, phenomenology, poststructuralism, the self, the moral ordinary
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