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International Water Scarcity and VariabilityManaging Resource Use Across Political Boundaries$
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Shlomi Dinar and Ariel Dinar

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780520283077

Published to California Scholarship Online: May 2017

DOI: 10.1525/california/9780520283077.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM CALIFORNIA SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.california.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of California Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CALSO for personal use.date: 21 September 2021

Institutions and the Stability of Cooperative Arrangements under Scarcity and Variability

Institutions and the Stability of Cooperative Arrangements under Scarcity and Variability

Chapter:
(p.81) 4 Institutions and the Stability of Cooperative Arrangements under Scarcity and Variability
Source:
International Water Scarcity and Variability
Author(s):

Shlomi Dinar

Ariel Dinar

Publisher:
University of California Press
DOI:10.1525/california/9780520283077.003.0004

This chapter focuses on the role of institutions in facilitating treaty effectiveness. It discusses the importance of international agreements in promoting and sustaining cooperation. It considers treaty design to further reflect on the type of treaties, and the various mechanisms stipulated in these agreements, that contribute to treaty effectiveness by assuaging conflict in situations of water scarcity and increased variability. The chapter argues that the design of a treaty seems particularly relevant in regions where climate change and water variability could impact the ability of basin states to effectively manage shared water. The chapter demonstrates how various mechanisms such as different water allocation mechanisms, as well as additional stipulations, such as, side-payments, issue-linkage, benefit-sharing, adaptability, and information exchange, affect the performance of the treaty in the context of water scarcity and variability. These mechanisms are examined from an empirical and large-n perspective, assessing how treaties with such mechanisms fare compared to treaties devoid of these mechanisms.

Keywords:   side-payments, issue-linkage, benefit-sharing, adaptability, information exchange, institutional mechanisms, Enforcement, Monitoring, conflict resolution, joint commission

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