Changing the Enforcement Paradigm
Changing the Enforcement Paradigm
This chapter reflects upon the case studies in the three preceding chapters to examine the inter-dependencies and varying interests among corporate and state actors in the regulation of online infringement. It considers how the private transnational regime regulates through technology and concludes major intermediaries have the capacity to act as private arbiters of the legality of goods, services, and technologies. The agreements are designed to streamline, simplify and accelerate enforcement processes to enable regulation to occur globally, rapidly and over a mass population. Principles of due process and accountability, however, are generally incompatible with the shift toward rapid mass policing. The non-binding agreements are intended to push intermediaries to exceed their legal responsibilities voluntarily, in the absence of legislation and court orders, in a form of compliance-plus regulation. The goal is also to enable U.S. and European rights holders to set rules regarding the protection of intellectual property that are then exported worldwide, especially to China.
Keywords: Compliance-plus regulation, Mass policing, China, Private arbiters, Private transnational regime
California Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
